

**PROPHET MUḤAMMAD (PEACE BE UPON HIM)
AND ‘UYAYNAH B. ḤIṢN (R.A.): A CASE STUDY
OF EARLY ISLAMIC INTERTRIBAL
DIPLOMACY**

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Abstract

This source-critical article examines the political and interpersonal dynamics that defined the relationship between Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) and the Najdī chieftain ‘Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn al-Fazārī (*Allah be pleased with him*). Methodologically, it compares parallel and conflicting reports within the *sīra*–*maghāzī* and historical traditions, distinguishing where possible between what the sources explicitly attest and what their evidence permits historians reasonably to infer. Although ‘Uyaynah (*Allah be pleased with him*) is repeatedly depicted as a disruptive and opportunistic figure — raiding the Prophet’s camel herds, opposing Islam in the Battle of the Trench, and threatening armed resistance at Khaybar — he also emerges as a man whose allegiance the Prophet (*peace be upon him*) actively courted and whose presence was tolerated even in symbolically charged moments such as the conquest of Mecca. This study argues that dealings of Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) with ‘Uyaynah (*Allah be pleased with him*) highlight a crucial aspect of the Medinan polity: its pragmatic engagement with powerful tribal actors who remained outside or on the margins of Islam until very late. By reconstructing ‘Uyaynah’s political trajectory from pre-Islamic *sayyid* of the Banū Fazārah and a Ghatafānī commander to a late convert included among “those whose hearts are to be reconciled”, the article sheds light on the strategies through which Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) sought to neutralize threats, secure

alliances, and extend authority into the Najd. In turn, the case of ‘Uyaynah challenges simplistic binary categories of Muslim and unbeliever, revealing instead a fluid diplomatic situation in which negotiation, inducement, and symbolic inclusion operated alongside religious persuasion.

Keywords: Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) and tribal diplomacy, Banū Ghatafān and Fazārah, Sīra-maghāzī historiography, Early Islamic state formation, Najdī Bedouin political culture

Introduction

The ninth-century Arab chronicler al-Wāqidī makes a striking claim: that when the Islamic Prophet Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) rode into Mecca as the head of an army of ten thousand warriors — his greatest triumph and a reversal of the situation when he fled the city a decade earlier as a refugee after years of persecution — he did not ride in between long-established Muslim *companions* such as Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq or ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (*Allah be pleased with them both*). He rode into his former city, which surrendered with almost no resistance, between two polytheistic Bedouin tribal leaders who had not yet sworn allegiance to him, much less become Muslims. They were ‘Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn b. Ḥudhayfah al-Fazārī and al-Aqra’ b. Ḥābis al-Tamīmī.¹ What is even more striking is that one of them, ‘Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn, had been a thorn in Muḥammad’s flesh for many years. As ‘Uyaynah himself later commented to a fellow Ghatafānī chief: “My story with Muḥammad is, as you know, not perfect.”² Amongst other misbehaviour, he had raided the Prophet’s camel herds, led his men against Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) in the Battle of the Trench, and threatened to oppose him during the Battle of Khaybar. Yet here he was: a polytheist riding into Mecca at the shoulder of the Prophet of Islam (*peace and blessings of Allah be upon him*). Even if this narration has not been widely repeated, the fact that a major biographer like al-Wāqidī quoted it and did not dismiss it or favour another narration over it, means that it was, in his mind, plausible.³

The presence of these two polytheistic leaders at side of Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) is more than a narrative curiosity. It exposes a dimension of early Islamic statecraft that remains understudied: Muḥammad’s ongoing and often uneasy engagement with the great Bedouin tribes that surrounded Medina. These included

the Banu Khuzā'a, the Banū Sulaym, and the Banū Ghaṭafān, amongst others. They all feature to various degrees in Muḥammad's struggle for security and this article's focus on the Ghaṭafān and its subtribe the Fazārah should not be understood as meaning that they were especially villainous.

While the *sīra-maghāzī* tradition devotes considerable attention to Qurashī opponents in Mecca and Jewish tribes in Medina, the Prophet's decade-long encounter with the surrounding tribal elites reveals a different political problem. These groups did not fully share the settled towns' commercial and pilgrimage interests (although their camels were involved as transport for produce and they provided security along key routes), nor did they participate in the so-called Medina Document, the *Ṣaḥīfat al-Madīna*, that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) apparently initiated shortly after his *hijra* from Mecca in September 622 CE to create a type of supra-tribal unity within Medina. Instead, they represented mobile and militarized powers whose loyalty could not be compelled directly but had to be negotiated, bought, or neutralized.

No figure exemplifies this dynamic more sharply than 'Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn b. Ḥudhayfa al-Fazārī (*Allah be pleased with him*). Descended from the house of Badr, one of the old aristocratic lineages of Qays 'Aylān, 'Uyaynah inherited a position of regional prominence. The house of Badr had played a leading role in the pre-Islamic war of Dāḥis wa-l-Ghabrā' and in the subsequent consolidation of Ghaṭafān's tribal alignments, and 'Uyaynah's own emergence as a war leader in the early seventh century positioned him as a man whose acceptance or hostility could significantly affect the embryonic Islamic polity's security. Indeed, the *sīra-maghāzī* literature presents 'Uyaynah as a persistent antagonist in the mid-Medinan period whose problematic behaviour demonstrated his disinterest in, or even active opposition to, Muḥammad's ascendancy.

Yet the response of Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) to 'Uyaynah (*Allah be pleased with him*) was neither straightforward nor uniform. Rather than eliminating him or refusing negotiations, the Prophet (*peace be upon him*) repeatedly sought to co-opt him through promises, concessions, inducements, and symbolic gestures. The attempt during the Battle of the Trench to break the enemy coalition's cohesion by offering the Ghaṭafān a share of Medina's date harvest — an offer rejected by own supporters of Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of*

Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions) but consistent with classical Arab diplomacy — demonstrates the strategic value ascribed to ‘Uyaynah’s potential defection. Later narratives portray Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) tolerating the chief’s blunt and even insolent manner and bestowing material gifts upon him after the conquest of Mecca and the Battle of Ḥunayn, “in order to reconcile his heart”. However unflattering ‘Uyaynah’s character may appear in the Islamic sources, these actions attest to a deliberate policy of accommodating certain tribal leaders whose cooperation was deemed essential for securing the Islamic polity.

This article situates the relationship between Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) and ‘Uyaynah (*Allah be pleased with him*) within broader debates about the Prophet’s political and diplomatic engagement with Arabian tribal confederations. The scholarship on *mu’allaḥa qulūbuhum* (reconciling hearts) has often centered on theological questions of charity or the moral economy of gift-giving. By contrast, this study contends that the category represents a coherent strategy of statecraft aimed at stabilizing volatile peripheries. Through a close reading of the principal narrative sources — especially Ibn Hishām, al-Wāqidī, Ibn Sa’d, and al-Ṭabarī — combined with genealogical and *adab* materials (works that deal mainly with conduct and ethics), the article reconstructs a sequential portrait of ‘Uyaynah’s interactions with the Prophet (*peace be upon him*), highlighting how negotiations, coercion, and transactional diplomacy coexisted within the Medinan project.

This study is a work of history. It employs the conventional source-critical method of historical reconstruction rather than imposing a predetermined theoretical model upon the evidence. Reports are assessed comparatively, with particular weight given to relative chronology, independent or multiple attestation, consistency with securely established circumstances, and the interests and literary purposes of individual transmitters and compilers. Where accounts conflict, the article does not assume that harmonisation is possible, but identifies the divergence and distinguishes explicit testimony from historical inference. Al-Wāqidī requires particular caution: his unusually detailed *maghāzī* material is indispensable for reconstructing many episodes involving ‘Uyaynah, but its detail cannot itself establish historicity. His reports are therefore treated most confidently when corroborated by earlier or independent traditions, and more cautiously when they stand alone. Throughout, expressions

such as ‘probably’, ‘possibly’, ‘appears’, and ‘may’ deliberately mark degrees of inference rather than statements of provable fact.

Understanding ‘Uyaynah’s political behaviour also helps to clarify the nature of tribal responses to the Prophet (*peace be upon him*). The Ghatafān’s resistance cannot be reduced to religious disagreement. It grew from competition for pastureland and water, control of trade routes, fluctuating alliances with Khaybar, and the prestige economy of Najdī chieftainship.

The central historical question is therefore straightforward: why did Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) repeatedly negotiate with, accommodate, and eventually incorporate a tribal leader who had repeatedly opposed him and whose loyalty remained uncertain? The article seeks to answer this question by reconstructing their relationship chronologically and situating individual episodes within the changing balance of power between Medina and the Ghatafān. Of course, unstated motivations remain inferential, but care has been taken not to exceed the limits of either the sources or psychological plausibility.

By analysing these factors through the lens of relationship of Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) with ‘Uyaynah (*Allah be pleased with him*) and his tribe, the article seeks to explain an aspect of Muḥammad’s (*peace be upon him*) career that remains overshadowed by his far more analyzed conflicts with the Quraysh and with Medina’s Jews. The case examined in this article demonstrates that the needs of Prophet (*peace be upon him*) to establish security and prosperity confronted him with seasoned political actors among the surrounding tribes whose engagement required careful negotiation, and whose opposition, when it came, was rooted in longstanding traditions of tribal autonomy. The resulting interplay of rivalry and accommodation, and of independence and eventual integration, provides a uniquely revealing window into the formation of early Islamic authority.

The Political Geography of Central Arabia

The Banū Fazārah appears throughout the early Arabic genealogical and historical corpus as one of the principal subtribes of the Banū Dhubyān, itself a major branch of the Ghatafān confederation.⁴ The Ghatafān, a Qays ‘Aylānī grouping, consisted of three primary constituent tribes — ‘Abs, Ashja’, and Dhubyān — with the latter emerging in the Prophet’s lifetime as the dominant political

force within the confederation. Within Dhubyān, the Fazārah and the Murrah formed the leading subtribes, overshadowing the smaller Dhubyānī lineages in both numbers and influence. Of these, the Banū Fazārah, and particularly the house of Badr within them, emerge in the Islamic sources as the most consequential Ghaṭafānī actors, repeatedly shaping the tribal politics of central Arabia on the eve of Islam.

Ibn Ḥazm’s *Jamharat ansāb al-‘Arab* sets out the standard genealogy, tracing the Fazārah to Fazārah b. Dhubyān b. Baghīd b. Rayth b. Ghaṭafān b. Sa’d b. Qays ‘Aylān, and treating them as a substantial subtribe with several prominent sub-lineages.⁵ This genealogical scheme is repeated in al-Balādhurī’s *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, which devotes a section to the Dhubyān and their Fazārī offshoots, placing them among the leading northern tribal groupings of the late pre-Islamic and early Islamic periods. The leadership of Fazārah in this era was concentrated in the house of Badr, whose members — Hudhayfa b. Badr, Ḥiṣn b. Hudhayfa, and ‘Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn — were significant Ghaṭafānī figures, featuring centrally in the narratives of the long-running Dāḥis wa-l-Ghabrā’ war (c. 550–570 CE) and many northern and central Arabian events through to the emergence of Islam.⁶

The early geographical tradition situates the *manāzil* (camping sites) of the Dhubyān and the Fazārah in central Najd, especially in the region of Wādī al-Rimma and the adjoining highland pastures east of Khaybar. Al-Qalqashandī’s reference to Fazārī encampments in the Najd and the *sīrah-maghāzī* reports concerning their movement between Wādī al-Qurā and the central plateau indicate that the tribe commanded a broad arc of territory extending from the desert interior to the western oases.⁷ Ibn Hishām, al-Wāqidī, Ibn Sa’d and al-Ṭabarī place them “outside Wādī al-Qurā” (a 25-mile-long oasis north of Medina dotted with mainly Jewish towns), northwest of Khaybar.⁸ They seem also to have exercised considerable authority in al-Jināb, a tribute-free grazing territory between al-Rimma valley and the central Najd plateau.⁹ Their seasonal camps were sometimes closer to Medina. Al-Wāqidī says that, for example, while the Muslims were marching north to Khaybar in May 628 CE, the Fazārī family encampment (where the warriors left the women, children and herds) was at Ḥayfā.¹⁰ This presumably denotes the al-Ḥayfā’ settlement within al-Ghāba just north of Medina (thus only six miles from *Thaniyat al-Wadā’*, in the north of the Medina oasis), where Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) raced horses.¹¹ This is the region from which ‘Uyaynah had very recently stolen some of milch camels of

Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*). Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) had commented that he feared the attack given that the camels were on the border of the Fazārah's locale.¹² This close proximity explains why 'Uyaynah had already become something of a bogeyman, with Muslims fearing that if they left Medina on a military campaign, 'Uyaynah might in their absence enter Medina where their women and children were vulnerable.¹³

The Fazārī warriors' mobility and ability to cross difficult desert is reflected in the *maghāzī* literature. When Ibn Hishām describes the composition of the enemy coalition at the Battle of the Trench in April 627 CE, he lists the Ghaṭafān forces under 'Uyaynah as coming from the central steppe, while al-Wāqidī in his *Maghāzī* notes Fazārī participation in operations both near Medina and deep into the Najd. The same pattern emerges from the accounts of 'Uyaynah's *al-Ghāba* (also called *Dhū Qarad*) raid on the Prophet's milch camels, with Fazārī fighters depicted as striking near Medina and withdrawing quickly into the open desert. Their ability to operate effectively across this expanse underscores the strategic significance of their homelands.

These genealogical and geographical realities translate into considerable political and military weight. The *Dāḥis wa-l-Ghabrā'* narratives preserved in the *ayyām* tradition depict the Fazārah as capable of sustaining a long and violent conflict with Banū 'Abs, a sign of both numerical strength and access to allies within the wider Qays network. Al-Ṭabarī's account of the Confederates further attributes several thousand men to the Ghaṭafān–Fazārī contingent, which is evidence of their status as one of the most formidable Bedouin groupings confronting Medina. Their cooperation with Khaybar, attested in both Ibn Sa'd and al-Wāqidī, further indicates their capacity to project influence into the oasis zones and to form meaningful alliances with settled communities.

When viewed through the lens of these sources, the Banū Fazārah emerges not as a marginal Bedouin tribe but as a regional force whose economic base in camel pastoralism, control over key stretches of the Najd, and genealogical prestige within Qays 'Aylān rendered them central actors in the politics of western and central Arabia during the Prophet's lifetime. This background is essential for understanding both the boldness and the leverage of 'Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn, and it clarifies why his stance—whether hostile, neutral, or allied—

could substantially affect the security and strategic calculations of the Medinan polity.

‘Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn

The early Arabic sources consistently portray ‘Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn as already a figure of consequence in the final decades of the *Jāhiliyyah*. His lineage alone placed him among the recognized aristocracy of the northern tribes. Ibn Ḥazm lists the house of Badr—Hudhayfa b. Badr, followed by his son Ḥiṣn, and then by ‘Uyaynah—as one of the principal leadership lines of Banū Fazārah.¹⁴

‘Uyaynah was the heir to the authority and martial reputation of his father, Ḥiṣn. Al-Balādhurī records that Ḥiṣn’s mother, al-Naḍīra bt. Rawwās, was known as *al-Laḡīṭa* because she was separated from her people on a raid and taken by another group, a detail that underscores the turbulent intertribal environment of Fazārī life and hints at the martial atmosphere in which the family operated. Ḥiṣn himself appears as an active and forceful tribal leader.¹⁵ One anecdote recounts how his violence against ‘Amr b. ‘Āmir al-Ghaṭafānī during a confrontation was memorialized in early verse. Other lines of poetry preserved by al-Balādhurī praise his prowess with the spear and depict him as a figure whose actions compelled Fazārah to retaliatory mobilization. Additional reports describe him taking up arms to recover a captive female relative and bravely confronting rival warriors in the process. These episodes convey a portrait of a formidable tribal chief whose conduct shaped the martial reputation of Fazārah. ‘Uyaynah, the most prominent of Ḥiṣn’s sons, inherited this reputation. Al-Balādhurī notes that he was sometimes known by the sobriquet *Dhū al-Ra’s*, attributed to a swelling that afflicted his head, and that his name at birth was Hudhayfa, with a second physical oddity, bulging eyes, leading to him to be known more commonly as ‘Uyaynah.¹⁶

For the first almost five years of Muḥammad’s efforts to establish himself as the paramount leader of all the towns and tribal groups in the Yathrib oasis (finally united as Medina after the destruction of Jewish power by May 627 CE), there was no meaningful mention of ‘Uyaynah, and only sporadic mentions of the Fazārah, in the *sīra-maghāzī* literature. The sources preserve several traditions in which Fazārī figures appear on the periphery of Medina’s sphere of influence from as early as 3/4 AH (625/626 CE), whether as raiders, as participants in skirmishes near Wādī al-Qurā, or as figures whose loyalties were uncertain. While these episodes do not always name

‘Uyaynah directly, they form the backdrop against which his later actions must be understood. They show the porousness of the frontier between Medina and the central plateau, and the degree to which Fazārī leaders operated with confidence along that border. When ‘Uyaynah enters the narrative with force during the siege of Medina in April 627 CE, which has subsequently been called the Battle of the Trench (*Ghazwah al-Khandaq*), he is not introduced as a new, unexpected or obscure antagonist but as the scion of an established leadership lineage. His prominence in these sources is evidence not of sudden emergence as a new political actor but of pre-existing status as a chief versed in the politics of intertribal conflict; a man respected and obeyed despite, or perhaps because of, his bold and abrasive style; and a figure whose authority among the Ghaṭafān was significant enough to shape regional alignments. This background is essential for interpreting his later relationship with the dealings of Prophet. Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) with him in Medina were not encounters with an inconsequential desert raider but negotiations with an entrenched tribal aristocrat whose cooperation or hostility had real implications for the security of the early Islamic community.

The first named and datable appearance of ‘Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn in the Islamic narrative sources occurs during the Islamic raid on the Banū Muṣṭaliq at al-Muraysī‘ in January 627 CE, when a strong Muslim force led by Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) surprised and defeated the Muṣṭaliq branch of the Banū Khuza‘a. According to al-Wāqidī (but not Ibn Hishām, Ibn Sa‘d and al-Ṭabarī), on the return trip the Muslims became fearful because ‘Uyaynah’s Fazārī people were camped near Medina in accordance with a short-term pasturing agreement that ‘Uyaynah and Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) had concluded.¹⁷ The Prophet (*peace be upon him*) had agreed with ‘Uyaynah that his people could use pastures in Taghlamān as far as al-Marāḍ (thirty-six miles from Medina¹⁸) because a drought had caused serious problems for the Fazārī herds in their traditional pasturelands.¹⁹ The agreement does not imply that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) “owned” the pastureland in a modern sense; only that his authority extended that far out from Medina and that he would not militarily oppose the Fazārī being there. In any event, the term of the agreement had expired, and the Muslim warriors feared that ‘Uyaynah would, in their absence, enter Medina, where Muslim women and children were vulnerable. Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and*

Companions) reassured them that an angel was watching over Medina and that nothing harmful would transpire. The sources do not mention any violation of the agreement.

We next hear of 'Uyaynah — this time in detail as a significant actor — in the events of the Trench. Muḥammad's growing Islamic polity faced a powerful coalition (*al-Aḥzāb*) composed of warriors from the Quraysh of Mecca under Abū Sufyān b. Ḥarb, large contingents from the Ghaṭafān confederation — above all the Dhubyānī branches Fazārah and Murra led by 'Uyaynah and al-Ḥārith b. 'Awf — as well as allied groups from Banū Sulaym and several other Bedouin tribes. The coalition had been brought together diplomatically by exiled leaders of the Banū al-Naḍīr and morally supported from within Medina by the temporarily disloyal Banū Qurayẓah. 'Uyaynah probably commanded 1,000 Fazārīs (although al-Wāqidī curiously gives both this figure and a lower figure of 400), or around ten percent of the coalition force.²⁰ Al-Wāqidī and al-Balādhurī attribute 'Uyaynah's decision to take part solely to greed, noting that members of the Banū al-Naḍīr who were now exiled in Khaybar, promised the Ghaṭafān the date harvest of Khaybar for a year, and that “no one was quicker [to respond] than 'Uyaynah b. Hiṣn.”²¹

The Muslims dug a trench across the Medina valley to protect the towns behind it from the advancing coalition. The stand-off between the two sides was highly stressful for the Muslims, especially for those with houses close to the trench and, indeed, for everyone after news that the Banū Qurayẓah had torn up its bilateral treaty with Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*).²² Both the Holy Qur'ān and the early sources speak of the Muslims' acute fear and disillusionment (greater, according to Mūsā b. 'Uqba, than anything they had experienced since the defeat at Uḥud over two years earlier, in March 625).²³

Ibn Hishām, al-Wāqidī and al-Ṭabarī say that, when Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) judged that his people's fear and suffering had reached an unacceptable level, he reached out diplomatically to the two Ghaṭafānī leaders, 'Uyaynah b. Hiṣn and al-Ḥārith b. 'Awf, to offer an inducement for them to withdraw from the coalition. He offered them one-third of Medina's dates.²⁴ In Ibn Sa'd's and al-Balādhurī's versions, Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) made the offer only to 'Uyaynah. Al-Ḥārith b. 'Awf does not feature in the offer.²⁵ Either

way, Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) cannot have seriously believed that the Fazārī and Murrī contingents' withdrawal (much less the former alone) would weaken the overall force sufficiently for the Muslims to defeat the remaining ninety percent, which still outnumbered them three to one. Thus, he presumably hoped that their departure would sufficiently weaken the coalition's morale and cohesion so that other groups, exhausted, hungry and cold, might also abandon the cause.

One should not attribute unusual greed to 'Uyaynah for being attracted to both offers of dates for specific political actions: the Banū al-Naḍīr's promise of half of Khaybar's dates in return for fighting the Meccan Islamic polity within a coalition, or Muḥammad's offer of one-third of Medina's dates in return for not fighting. The Banū Fazārah's quality of life, often little beyond subsistence, rested on a seasonally uncertain pastoral-raiding economy. Like all the semi-nomadic peoples, they sometimes supplemented their resources through political agreements that provided produce or payment in exchange for services. For a tribe with a recognised martial reputation, contributing to a battle — by fighting and profiting, or by refraining and still profiting — offered significant potential reputational and material benefit.

The sources agree that 'Uyaynah came to Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) (in a state of *amān*, or protection) and said that he would withdraw Ghaṭafānī forces from Medina for fifty percent, not thirty. Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) stuck to his original offer and 'Uyaynah accepted. 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān drew up a contract, ready for signature, but Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) still had to get his own supporters to agree. After all, the dates he was potentially negotiating away belonged to them. The "two Sa'ds" — Sa'd ibn Mu'ādh from the Aws (specifically from the subtribe of Banū 'Abd al-Ashhal) and Sa'd ibn 'Ubādah from the Khazraj (and chief of Banū Sā'ida) — were very unhappy, and stated that they would accept the arrangement only if Allāh Almighty had ordained it or Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) was ordering their compliance. They would give the Ghaṭafān "nothing but the sword!" Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) — always the man of *Shūrā*, or tribal consultation — accepted their decision, the agreement collapsed and 'Uyaynah returned to his own line.

Interestingly, al-Wāqidī (alone, not even followed by his student Ibn Sa’d), who is relentlessly unkind in his depiction of ‘Uyaynah, described him as having uncouthly stretched out his legs in front of Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) and then, once he had seen Muḥammad’s own men challenge and then reject his proposed agreement, exclaimed: “By Allāh, the plan you have left was better for you than the plan you have agreed. And you have no power over these people!”²⁶

‘Uyaynah returned to his camp empty-handed, but painfully aware that his Qurayshī allies would soon learn what he had tried to do (disloyally swap sides to accept the best financial outcome) and would despise and mock the Ghaṭafān’s unfaithfulness. They would henceforth not be able to count on any reciprocal loyalty. Even worse, ‘Uyaynah had seen first-hand how firmly Muḥammad’s men were committed to fighting. Far from being on the point of collapse after weeks of siege, as ‘Uyaynah had hoped, they were still aggressive and fiery.²⁷ The Ghaṭafān withdrew soon thereafter.

The sources provide no watertight evidence that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) intended the episode as political theatre, and the possibility therefore remains necessarily speculative. Nonetheless, the course of the negotiation permits consideration of whether it may also have served that political purpose. If he were serious about gaining peace for a price, which was itself an eminently reasonable thing to do, he would have persevered with his offer to ‘Uyaynah and not given in to the *Anṣārī* leaders. They had already affirmed to him on that occasion that they would comply with their *bay‘ah* and “listen to and obey” him, even if his decision were merely personal diplomatic intuition and not a direct revelation from Allāh Almighty. Creating an opportunity to expose the Ghaṭafān’s duplicity would seriously undermine the integrity of the coalition. If this was Muḥammad’s plan, it was a clever move with a highly desirable outcome.

Years of antagonism

W. Montgomery Watt suggests that ‘Uyaynah may have felt so “unfairly treated in this matter” that, around four months later, in August 627 CE, he raided the Prophet’s milch camels outside Medina, “causing great perturbation but getting the worst of the exchanges.”²⁸ The event is actually rather inconsequential, is narrated in the dramatic

style of the *ayyām* accounts from the pre-Islamic period (complete with poetic odes and exaggerated descriptions of horses, heroism, archery skills, and swords splitting helmets), and seems to appear in the early Islamic narratives to add colour to the portrait of ‘Uyaynah as fickle and untrustworthy.²⁹ Yet the raiding of other groups’ herds was done by all tribes, and even by Muḥammad’s polity. Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) had himself gained these milch camels through raiding; they came from earlier expeditions at Dhāt al-Riqā‘ and in the Najd.³⁰

Interestingly, Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) himself worried about the safety of the milch camels, being well aware that al-Ghāba — where he had moved them from the safety of al-Bayda’ because that area had become barren — was “on their borders,” meaning the amorphous area between Muslims and the camping area at that time of ‘Uyaynah and his people.³¹

The early sources agree on the story’s outline. A Fazārī raiding party of around forty warriors, operating from the Ghaṭafān side of the frontier, descended on Muḥammad’s camels grazing at al-Ghāba, north of Medina. They killed the herdsman, seized his wife and a number of the Prophet’s prized milch camels, and drove them off toward the Najdī interior. The attack caused alarm in Medina, both because the animals belonged personally to the Prophet (*peace be upon him*) and because it demonstrated once again the vulnerability of Medianan herds on the edge of Ghaṭafānī pasturelands.

When news reached Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*), he ordered an immediate pursuit. The key figure in the counterraid is Salama b. al-Akwa‘, who set off rapidly on foot, shadowing the raiders and harassing them with arrows while waiting for mounted support. In the ensuing running fight, Salama and the small Muslim force of eight warriors that caught up with him repeatedly engaged the Fazārīs, recovering some of the camels and inflicting casualties. The sources emphasize Salama’s physical prowess and courage: he sprinted after the raiders, used terrain to his advantage, and fearlessly called out to them as he shot, delaying until the reinforcements arrived. Then, with the exaggeration found most conspicuously in the pre-Islamic *ayyām* battle stories, but also sometime in the *maghāzī* narratives³², Mūsā b. ‘Uqba says “a fierce battle took place”.³³

Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) and his war-party advanced as far as Dhū Qarad, where the pursuing party rejoined him. By that stage half of the captured animals had been recovered, and the raiders retreated toward their home territory. The Muslims returned to Medina with the camels and a sense that the Prophet's chiefly honour had been maintained.

Although the scale of the encounter was very small and casualty-light (with only one Muslim and three Fazārīs killed, including Ḥubayb, one of 'Uyaynah's own sons³⁴), the episode is remembered in the *sīra-maghāzī* literature because it encapsulated the tense, transactional relationship between Medina and the Fazārī-Ghaṭafānī frontier, and because it contributed to the emerging image of 'Uyaynah and his people as persistent but ultimately thwarted antagonists of the Medinan polity.

Yet there may be more to the story than just the pursuit of rustlers. The sources depict Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) and his contingent donning full armour and helmets, which certainly implies that they anticipated something far more significant and violent than a hot pursuit. His force totalled 500 (or 700) fully armoured men, along with slaughtering camels to eat if the campaign dragged on. They even assigned a battle war cry, which was ordinarily a feature of set-piece battles. No less importantly, he left 300 equally equipped men in Medina to guard the city, under the command of the Khazrajī leader Sa'd b. 'Ubādah.³⁵ This can only mean that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) feared either that the Fazārī raid was a ruse designed to draw pursuing Muslim warriors into a major battle outside the city or that 'Uyaynah intended the raid to pull Islamic strength away from the city, which he might then attack. The Prophet's poet Ḥassān b. Thābit (*Allah be pleased with him*) even composed a poem with the revealing line: "Did 'Uyaynah think that when he visited it [Medina], he would destroy its fortresses? ... You ['Uyaynah] said, 'We will take a lot of spoils.'"³⁶

The former scenario is actually most likely, and appears to have been in Muḥammad's mind, because when his force reached Dhū Qarad he led them in the "fear prayer" (*ṣalāt al-khawf*), a ritual that allowed a frightened force to pray while remaining vigilant for an imminent attack. Half of his force remained watchful, ready to repel an enemy assault, while the other half joined him in prayer. The two halves then swapped places.³⁷ This special prayer is even mentioned in the Holy Qur'an.³⁸ He certainly would not have used it here had he not

worried about or anticipated an attack. One cannot speculate on whether ‘Uyaynah planned to lure the Islamic force into an ambush, and therefore whether Muḥammad’s show of strength had deterred such an attack. The sources are silent, except possibly for a line in a poem quoted by Ibn Hishām and Mūsā b. ‘Uqba: “We escaped from the claws of a cunning lion”.³⁹ All we can reasonably draw from Muḥammad’s response is that it shows that ‘Uyaynah and his people genuinely posed a powerful threat, one that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) could not afford to take lightly.

‘Uyaynah next appears in the *sīra-maghāzī* narratives as an antagonist in the Islamic campaign against Khaybar’s Jews in May 628 CE, around nine months after the Fazārī raid on the milch camels. Muḥammad’s decision to attack Khaybar arose from converging strategic and security concerns. After the Battle of the Trench, which Khaybarī leaders took a lead in initiating, those leaders travelled to tribal groups in the Najd to mobilise support against Medina, and prominent Naḍīrī figures expelled from Medina, now residing with their kin in Khaybar, sought to avenge themselves and regain their former position. Ḥuyayy b. Akḥṭab, Sallām b. Abī al-Ḥuqayq and others had financed and organised opposition to Muḥammad’s polity and continued to cultivate alliances hostile to it. Khaybar provided these exiles with fortified bases and agricultural wealth, allowing them to act as an independent power that was able to coordinate with tribes including the Ghaṭafān and sustain pressure on Medina’s northern frontier. The oasis thus remained a persistent source of incitement and a potential launch point for further attacks. Made possible by a secret clause in the Treaty of al-Ḥudaybiyya with Mecca — in which the Meccans agreed that they would not support Khaybar against Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) if he marched north against it, or would not attack Medina while its warriors were absent at Khaybar⁴⁰ — Muḥammad’s expedition aimed to eliminate the threat, dismantle the network of anti-Medinan alliances centered there, and secure control of a prosperous oasis with political ambitions that directly challenged Medina’s security.

Although the *sīra-maghāzī* sources differ in detail, they consistently portray ‘Uyaynah as one of Khaybar’s most important prospective tribal allies in the months leading up to Muḥammad’s northern campaign. For their part, segments of the Ghaṭafān, especially ‘Uyaynah’s Fazārī bloc, saw advantage in aligning with Khaybar’s anti-Medinan agenda: the opportunity to share in Khaybar’s

significant agricultural wealth, to preserve autonomy against a growing Medinan polity, and to maintain influence over the caravan routes and pasturelands of the northern Najd. Khaybar's leaders, including the Naḍīrī exiles, had already courted the Ghaṭafān before the Trench by promising substantial material rewards. Now, in grave fear of a northward attack from Medina, and tipped off by a Fazārī merchant "who was their ally [*ḥalīf lahum*]" who had seen Islamic military preparations in Medina⁴¹, they urgently repeated their inducements.

Scholars are unsure of the location of the Prophet's arrival in the Khaybar oasis, but it may not have been from the south, as one might have imagined. After capturing and questioning a Jewish Bedouin shepherd from the Banū Ashja' — who later converted to Islam under threat of execution (as a spy, not as a Jew) — the Muslims learned that a delegation of the Jews of Khaybar led by Kinānah b. Abī al-Ḥuqayq and Hawdha b. Qays had contracted with "their allies of the Ghaṭafān [*ḥulafā'ihim min Ghaṭafān*]" to fight with Khaybar if it was attacked, in return for the dates of Khaybar for a year (a second narration in al-Wāqidī says it for half the dates).⁴² Learning this, Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) immediately moved his advance route to Wādī al-Rajī' (towards the northern end of the oasis⁴³) in order to place himself between the Ghaṭafān and Khaybar, thereby believing that he could, if he had to, fight the Ghaṭafān before they could link up with their Naḍīrī allies to form a much greater force.⁴⁴

Although the sources mainly use the term "the Ghaṭafān" to denote Khaybar's Bedouin allies, they then name only 'Uyaynah and his warriors, so we may infer that the allies were primarily the Banū Fazārah, although members of Banū Murrah are also mentioned.⁴⁵ The use of the word *ḥulafā'* (sing. *ḥalīf*) is technical. In early Arabian tribal law, *ḥilf* (alliance) referred to a formal contractual relationship. It could take several forms: *ḥilf al-muḏāharah* (mutual-defense pact); *ḥilf al-jiwār* (protective alliance/clientship); or *ḥilf al-mu'āqadah* (written or sworn covenant). When the early *sīra-maghāzī* writers use this expression for the Khaybar-Fazārah situation, they are invoking this technical vocabulary of treaty-alliances, not merely ad hoc cooperation. In early Arabian prose, if the intended meaning were simply "supporters" or "sympathizers," one would expect terms such as *aḥābīb*, *anwā*, *awliyā'*, or simply *qawm min Ghaṭafān*. The use of *ḥulafā'* is deliberate.

Much as the Islamic sources (especially al-Wāqidī) attempt to portray ‘Uyaynah as untrustworthy and greedy (and on occasion he seems to have been), his commitment to the Jews of Khaybar as his allies appears to have been genuine. When Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) sent a messenger to induce him to abandon the Khaybarīs to their fate, offering him half of Khaybar’s dates for a year, ‘Uyaynah refused to abandon his alliance.⁴⁶ He had been willing to withdraw from the Qurashī-led coalition during the Battle of the Trench, having not been formally allied to the Quraysh or the Sulaym. But here he was formally allied to the Jews of Khaybar, and tribal honour required him to uphold that alliance. Indignantly, he told Muḥammad’s messenger: “I will not betray my allies and neighbours.”⁴⁷ Another narrative in al-Wāqidī quotes ‘Uyaynah declaring: “By Allāh, we will not desert our allies for anything.”⁴⁸ In any event, he added, he did not believe that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) would prevail.

The big question remains as to why ‘Uyaynah’s Ghaṭafānī contingent did not support their allies in Khaybar as he had promised it would. In fact, it seems they started to do so, sending as many as four thousand warriors to Khaybar’s aid, but they withdrew without fighting after becoming concerned for their wives and children, whom they had left with their herds in an encampment at Ḥayfā’. As noted above, this presumably denotes the al-Ḥayfā’ settlement within al-Ghāba just north of Medina. Fearing that a Muslim force might actually attack them in their absence, ‘Uyaynah’s warriors force abandoned their journey to Khaybar in order to return to defend their families. Al-Wāqidī even repeats a narration stating that the Ghaṭafān reached Khaybar, entering a fortress before suddenly — upon hearing a strange (unattributable and by inference supernatural) voice mentioning their families in Ḥayfā’ — leaving the oasis to return to their people.⁴⁹ According to this narrative, the Ghaṭafān later blamed Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) for having tricked them.⁵⁰ ‘Uyaynah is supposed to have said: “This, by Allāh, is a trick by Muḥammad and his companions. He deceived us, by Allāh.” Mūsā b. ‘Uqba and Ibn Sa’d do not mention this supernatural voice at all, or any other reason for ‘Uyaynah and his men’s departure. Ibn Hishām and al-Ṭabarī say only that the Ghaṭafān turned back after hearing noise, or a noise, behind them just after setting off from their families that made them think the Muslims might be behind them.⁵¹ They therefore turned back and stayed with their families. Regardless of which narrative makes most sense, their absence from the battle left Muḥammad (*The Final*

Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions) and his warriors in a greatly strengthened position *vis-a-vis* their siege. Although the month-long siege was difficult and exhausting, the Muslims took Khaybar’s fortresses, defeated all resistance, and imposed upon the Banū al-Naḍīr an agreement that they would henceforth pay a tribute of half their date crop each year.

After reaching Ḥayfā’ and seeing that his people were safe, ‘Uyaynah reportedly rested for a few days before heading north again to honour his commitment to his allies in Khaybar. He swore again that he would not abandon them. He arrived in Khaybar to find that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) had already taken the fortresses, defeated his Naḍīrī allies, and captured significant booty.⁵² It was too late to intervene, and his reputation had greatly suffered. The defeated Naḍīrīs felt bitterly let down and told him so, accusing him of breaking his word. His claims that he thought they could defeat the Muslims by themselves fell on deaf ears, and Tha‘labah b. Sallām b. Abī al-Ḥuqayq — a member of the prominent Banū al-Ḥuqayq, one of the leading Jewish families of Khaybar and a branch of the Naḍīr — hotly rejected his excuses, telling him that he had misled and abandoned his allies, as he had done with the Quraysh during the Battle of the Trench. ‘Uyaynah protested that he had returned to Khaybar to help. “Who remains for you to help?” Tha‘labah is reported to have said. “Some were killed, and those who survived have become the slaves of Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*), who has taken us captive.”⁵³ Even an unnamed Ghatafānī is supposed to have chided him: “You did not help your allies or keep your agreement. And you did not even get Khaybar’s dates from Muḥammad for a year.”⁵⁴

Curiously, ‘Uyaynah made a direct appeal to Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) for a share of the spoils — Mūsā b. ‘Uqba claims that he asked for what Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) had originally offered him⁵⁵ — and insisted to the Prophet (*peace be upon him*) that he had stayed away to give Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) a free hand against Khaybar’s Jews, whom he had chosen to abandon.⁵⁶ Al-Wāqidī (in a conversation not mentioned by Ibn Hishām, Ibn Sa‘d, al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭabarī) narrates that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) called ‘Uyaynah a liar and said that the Fazārī chief had only left because he feared for his family.

When ‘Uyaynah pushed again for a share, Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) promised him Dhū al-Ruqayba, a mountain in Khaybar.⁵⁷

Scholars have not commented on the fact that this would have been a very unusual gift to a semi-nomadic warrior who had hoped to receive dates, camels or some other form of movable and recognized wealth. Indeed, the reported gift is one of the more puzzling episodes in the *sīra-maghāzī* corpus and appears to reflect divergent narrative agendas. In al-Wāqidī’s account, the episode is framed as a form of reconciliation: when ‘Uyaynah sought a share of the spoils, Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) is said to have given him Dhū al-Ruqayba, a gesture that later writers attempted to rationalize through symbolic or dream-related motifs. By contrast, the version preserved by Mūsā b. ‘Uqba presents the episode in a starkly different light. When members of Banū Fazārah demanded “their share and what had been promised,” Muḥammad’s response — assigning them Dhū al-Ruqayba, explicitly identified as “a mountain among the mountains of Khaybar” — provoked immediate outrage.⁵⁸ The Fazārīs reportedly replied, “Then we will fight you,” and only withdrew after Muḥammad’s uncompromising rejoinder that he was prepared to fight them at Janafa, a Fazārī watering source between Khaybar and Fadak. Unprepared to battle Muḥammad’s triumphant force which had just overcome the most powerful and well defended fortresses in the region, ‘Uyaynah and his men “fled”. In this earlier and more austere narrative, the gift of the mountain is neither reconciliatory nor bounteous; it functions instead as a refusal to concede material spoils, thinly disguised as a nominal allotment.

The contrast between these accounts is revealing. Whereas al-Wāqidī’s narrative locates the episode within a broader pattern of political accommodation, Ibn ‘Uqba’s version suggests a moment of sharp confrontation in which the offer of a mountain to semi-nomadic pastoralists was perceived by its recipients as worthless or insulting. Crucially, no source outside the narrative tradition explains the economic function, practical value or prestige-enhancing quality of Dhū al-Ruqayba. Further, the Fazārīs’ offended reaction in Ibn ‘Uqba’s narration means that, despite its consistency in some ways with the pattern of Muhammad’s engagement with ‘Uyaynah, we cannot simply accept at face value al-Wāqidī’s story of Muḥammad’s reconciliatory gift as the historical reality. Further evidence would be needed before accepting either.

It might be an opportune time to explain why al-Wāqidī devoted far more sustained attention to 'Uyaynah than Ibn Hishām and most other *sīrah* writers. Put simply, it is primarily because he was operating in a different genre and drawing on a different ecology of material. His *Kitāb al-maghāzī* is structured as a campaign history (with war presented as Muḥammad's primary agent of change), rather than as a rounded biography. It describes reconnaissance, route choices, tribal concentrations, battles, negotiations, and the tactical logic of raids and counterraids. 'Uyaynah appears repeatedly in precisely these contexts; as a Najdī war leader whose movements affected Medinan security, whose tribe's mobilization had to be monitored, and whose alliances required Muḥammad's diplomatic management. Ibn Hishām, by contrast, is a religiously focused redactor of Ibn Ishāq's far more rounded *sīrah* with a strongly selective editorial programme. He abridges, omits or slims down many raid elements, and frequently removes the kind of granular operational detail in which figures like 'Uyaynah are most visible. The difference, therefore, is not best explained by the different sources they draw upon, but by compilation purpose and method. Al-Wāqidī habitually assembles multi-stranded Medinan *akhbār* — often from Anṣārī and other Medinan transmitters whose local memory preserved the frontier problem posed by the Ghatafān, for example — whereas Ibn Hishām and the later compilers who adopted his focus and drew heavily upon his text tend to compress that material or redeploy it for other aims. In effect, al-Wāqidī's narrative focus makes 'Uyaynah loom large because it was designed to record the shifting mechanics of conflict and diplomacy around Medina's periphery; Ibn Hishām's focus does not.

After Khaybar

Even if al-Wāqidī wanted to show Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) as conciliatory at Khaybar, his narration of Bashīr b. Sa'd's raid on al-Jināb a few months after Khaybar (which Ibn Sa'd and al-Ṭabarī also narrate, drawing upon al-Wāqidī's reports) shows that 'Uyaynah and Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) were unreconciled and not yet in any form of treaty agreement. Al-Jināb was right in the heartland of Ghatafānī power. It lay northeast of Medina on the Najdī side of the Ḥijāz escarpment, within the broader Ghatafān grazing sphere, and was a *manzil* / *mar'ā* (camping or grazing area), not a settlement.

The reports explain the expedition there as a pre-emptive strike that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) ordered in response to intelligence that a concentration of Ghāṭafānī warriors had formed at al-Jināb — in response to ‘Uyaynah’s threat that if they did not join him he would march against them — in order to prepare an attack against Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) (who learned that they wanted him “or his limbs,” meaning his dismemberment).⁵⁹ Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) therefore dispatched Bashīr b. Sa’d with a strong mobile force, which some sources describe as three hundred men⁶⁰, moving rapidly and with deliberate concealment (travelling by night and resting by day) in order to catch the gathering before it could coalesce into a larger threat.

When Bashīr’s force arrived in al-Jināb, the Ghāṭafānī warriors scattered, and the Muslims seized substantial livestock and two captives (who converted to Islam). ‘Uyaynah’s name frames the episode in two ways: first, as the organiser whose leadership made the gathering dangerous; and second, as the figure implicitly responsible for the loss and humiliation that followed when the Islamic raid forced the dispersal of his confederates and stripped them of animals. In the narrative arc of Muḥammad’s dealings with ‘Uyaynah after Khaybar, al-Jināb thus functions as an instance in which the Medinan polity treated him not as a reconciled actor but as a still-volatile war leader requiring coercive containment.

Al-Wāqidī provides an extended and supposedly verbatim account of a deep conversation that ‘Uyaynah reportedly had with al-Ḥārith b. ‘Awf al-Murrī, a *sayyid* (chief) of the Banū Murrāh, who fled from al-Jināb with him. Al-Ḥārith had led his warriors against the Islamic polity during the Battle of the Trench, but now he was worn down by what he saw as the futility of continued resistance to Muḥammad’s authority. Now, hiding all day from the Islamic force with his friend ‘Uyaynah, he expressed this realisation. Al-Ṭabarī quotes al-Ḥārith speaking a single line: “The time has come, Uyaynah, for you to give up what are doing.”⁶¹ Al-Wāqidī reports all the claimed back and forth between the two, with the significant feature being that ‘Uyaynah accepted the truth of al-Ḥārith’s statement that, during battles against the Quraysh and Medina’s very powerful Jewish tribes, and against the Jews of Khaybar, who were the best and strongest of all the Jews, Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) had prevailed and entirely transformed authority in the *Ḥijāz*. ‘Uyaynah conceded: “By Allāh, it

is just as you say, but my own soul will not accept it.”⁶² When al-Ḥārith said that it was time to submit to Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*), ‘Uyaynah replied, showing both concern for his chiefly status and an insightful view of the makeup of the new Islamic polity: “Shall I become a mere follower, tagging along at the back? A people have already beaten us to him; they now look down on whoever comes after them and say, ‘We were at Badr and elsewhere.’” Al-Ḥārith’s agreement was just as insightful: “It is as you see, but if we had gone before them [submitting years earlier] we would now be among his elite companions.”

When both agreed that they should now visit Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) and swear allegiance, they bumped into Farwa b. Ḥubayra al-Qushayrī, a Qaysī Bedouin notable from the Banū Qushayr, a sub-tribe of the Banū ‘Āmir b. Ṣa‘ṣa‘ah (of Qays ‘Aylān), and asked for his view on whether they should follow their inclination. Farwa was still a polytheist and was himself unreconciled to Muḥammad’s authority. Although not as powerful as ‘Uyaynah, he had himself been a nuisance to Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*). He suggested that they should delay the decision until they saw what the Quraysh in Mecca, who were still holding out against Islam, would do next. Farwa was himself about to do the minor pilgrimage in Mecca and would try to learn the Quraysh’s intentions. Al-Ḥārith and ‘Uyaynah nervously decided to delay making any decision, waiting instead to hear what the Quraysh planned to do about Islam.

This implausibly detailed conversation is probably a retrospective creation, but it does accurately capture the difficult and confusing situation that many Bedouin leaders found themselves in during this period. Muḥammad’s power and influence had greatly increased and theirs had decreased, along with their autonomy and ability to sustain their traditional grazing and raiding habits.

As it happens, ‘Uyaynah next appears in the *sīra-maghāzī* literature as an ally of sorts during Muḥammad’s march on Mecca around fifteen or sixteen months later, in January 630 CE, when the Prophet (*peace be upon him*) chose to avenge an attack on his allies, the Banū Khuzā‘ah. Members of the Khuzā‘ah’s Ka‘b ibn ‘Amr branch, which had formally allied itself with Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) according to the Treaty of al-Ḥudaybiyya’s terms⁶³, had suffered a

night attack at their well at al-Watīr, near Mecca.⁶⁴ The assault came from the Banū al-Dīl, a branch of the Banū Bakr ibn ‘Abd Manāt ibn Kinānah, which had formally allied itself with the Quraysh (who supplied the Banū Bakr with weapons). When the Banū Khuzā‘ah appealed to Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) for support, he raised a force symbolically numbered as 10,000 warriors and began the southward march on Mecca.

The fact that ‘Uyaynah then turned up uninvited at al-‘Arj with an unnumbered but probably small group of Fazārī warriors during Muḥammad’s march, *and was accepted*⁶⁵, despite their tense history and despite having not yet sworn allegiance to Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) or become a Muslim⁶⁶, shows how talented Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) was in terms of mastering tribal politics and how pragmatic he was in his dealings with both stubborn tribes and polytheists. ‘Uyaynah was himself far more agreeable this time, avoiding demands or unreasonable requests and politely calling Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) “Messenger of God,” although he was still a polytheist.⁶⁷

It is noteworthy that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) accepted ‘Uyaynah despite him only having a small and therefore inconsequential number of men with him. Their presence would make no difference in terms of the military outcome, so Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) may therefore have seen his desire to take part as an opportunity finally to win over and therefore neutralise the residual threat from a troublesome former foe. For his part, ‘Uyaynah presumably recognised that, almost certainly, the Quraysh would not be able to oppose such a mighty force, and Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) would soon be master of the Ḥijāz. Al-Wāqidī quotes ‘Uyaynah expressing regret to Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (*Allah be pleased with him*) that he had not brought his entire force with him, presumably because he knew that spoils of war and grand reputations were allocated only to combatants.⁶⁸

After welcoming ‘Uyaynah and even letting him enter the city at his side⁶⁹ (according to al-Wāqidī), along with al-Aqra‘ ibn Ḥābis al-Tamīmī, another polytheistic chief, he then had ‘Uyaynah and his warriors join him during the follow-on Battles of Ḥunayn and al-Ṭā‘if.

Al-Wāqidī narrates at length a blood-money dispute involving 'Uyaynah on the Ḥunayn campaign, turning it into a sustained moral and political vignette centred on the killing of 'Āmir b. al-Aṣḥab al-Ashja'ī by Muḥallim b. Jaththāma.⁷⁰ When 'Uyaynah pressed his claim, Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) acknowledged the legitimacy of his right to choose either *diyat* (blood money) or the killer's death. Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) staged the adjudication publicly and repeatedly urged clemency, calling upon 'Uyaynah and his party to pardon the killer, who had openly repented and asked for forgiveness. Al-Wāqidī explains that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) acted in this way to impress upon those present the gravity of bloodshed in God's sight and to redirect established Arabian practices toward restraint and mercy. Significantly, Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) explicitly urged 'Uyaynah to accept blood money in place of retaliation and offered compensation of one hundred head of livestock to resolve the dispute. 'Uyaynah rejected the offer. He refused forgiveness, insisted on retribution, and ultimately demanded Muḥallim's execution. From the standpoint of customary tribal law, this course of action did not violate accepted norms: retaliation for an unpardoned killing lay fully within established honour practice and is even permitted in the Holy Qur'ān. For al-Wāqidī, however, the episode's importance lies in the tension it exposes. Muḥallim's execution marks the limits of the moral transformation that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) sought to embed within the emerging Islamic polity and demonstrates how firmly blood-honour norms could resist appeals to repentance, forgiveness, and negotiated settlement, even when articulated and enforced by prophetic authority.

Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) recognised that he could not compel 'Uyaynah to accept his urging of clemency, especially because the Fazārī chief was probably not a Muslim at that stage. Although Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) was by far the most powerful leader in Central and Northern Arabia by that stage, his authority over people rested on the *Bay'ah*, the traditional Arabian pledge of allegiance that bound someone to hear another's words and obey them, and/or the *shahādah*, the religious affirmation that there was no god but Allāh Almighty and that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) was his messenger. There is

no clear record of ‘Uyaynah doing either, although it is likely that he converted during the Ḥunayn campaign⁷¹ (W. Montgomery Watt doubts that he ever did⁷²) and he received from Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) a gift of one hundred camels — taken at Ḥunayn — as one of the *mu'allafah qulūbuhum* (the tribal leaders “whose hearts were to be reconciled”).⁷³ According to Ibn Hishām and al-Wāqidī, Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) himself said that he gave ‘Uyaynah the camels, along with the same amount to al-Aqra’, “in order to convert them [*wa-lākinnī ta'allafuhum li-yuslimā*]”.⁷⁴

‘Uyaynah was never a faultless ally. After he lauded the manly resistance of the polytheistic Banū Thaḳīf in al-Ṭā'if, and even encouraged them to hold out against the Muslims, Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (*Allah be pleased with him*) rebuked him, exclaiming that he was “always in falsehood [or error]” and had caused “much harm” since the days of the Banū Naḍīr, Qurayza and Khaybar. “You brought trouble against us and fought us with your sword. Then you submitted, so you say, but you [still] incite [our enemies] against us”.⁷⁵ ‘Uyaynah denied he was insincere and asked forgiveness. Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) informed his close friend ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (who threatened to behead ‘Uyaynah) not to worry or be angry; that the already repentant ‘Uyaynah had an “obedient type of foolishness” [*hādhā al-ḥumqu al-muṭā'ul*]. That is, he was a foolish but helpful ally. Moreover, he did not want anyone to say that he killed one of his *companions*.

The fact that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) called ‘Uyaynah a *companion* (*ṣaḥābī*) is itself strong evidence that he had become a Muslim by the time of the siege of al-Ṭā'if. The receipt of the camels is another. Perhaps the strongest is that Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) later sent ‘Uyaynah out as a tax gatherer. Probably in April or May 630 CE, he dispatched ‘Uyaynah to the Banū Tamīm to collect the community levy; named variously as *ṣadaqah* or *zakāt* in the early narratives, reflecting the still-fluid administrative vocabulary of the period. In this role ‘Uyaynah functioned as an Islamic emissary backed by coercive capacity (Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) gave him fifty warriors from the Bedouin, none of them from the *Muhājirūn* or the *Anṣār*, itself a sign of trust).⁷⁶ He was a Najdī chief in Muḥammad's service

whose presence signalled that Medina now claimed not only obedience in war but also regularized material extraction from peripheral tribes.

Certainly, even al-Wāqidī says that 'Uyaynah served the Islamic polity in these roles and records him as one of the tribal leaders who marched with Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) north to Tabūk in October 630 CE, not long before the Prophet's death. Al-Wāqidī nonetheless says, without explaining his rationale, that 'Uyaynah was one "of the Bedouins around you who are hypocrites" mentioned in a Qurānic revelation pertaining to Tabūk.⁷⁷ He elaborates without evidence: "There were men from the Bedouins, among them 'Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn and his people, who were pleasing the Prophet's companions and showing that they are with them, and at the same time pleasing those of their people who were polytheists."⁷⁸ This in many ways was an unfair complaint. Even if 'Uyaynah was a Muslim himself, and he did march out when the sources say that many did not, he still governed non-Muslim Fazārī whose needs and rights he could not ignore.

Conclusion

The arc of 'Uyaynah b. Ḥiṣn's relationship with Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) reveals not a simple movement from hostility to conversion, but the gradual incorporation of a Najdī aristocrat into an expanding polity through alternating cycles of coercion, bargaining, and calibrated toleration. Read sequentially, the sources depict 'Uyaynah less as an erratic "villain" than as a rational frontier chief operating within a pastoral-raiding economy and an honor-centered legal culture. His repeated calculations — such as joining oppositional coalitions for promised produce, probing Muḥammad's offer at the Trench, raiding at al-Ghāba, contracting with Khaybar, and reappearing opportunistically on the march to Mecca — suggest that he treated the Medinan polity as one power among others until it demonstrated unmistakable dominance across the Ḥijāz-Najd frontier. In this light, Muḥammad's consistent refusal to treat 'Uyaynah as a merely criminal raider becomes intelligible. He confronted an actor whose compliance could not be compelled permanently by punitive expeditions alone, yet whose defection or neutrality could reshape the strategic map.

Several episodes expose the mechanisms by which Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) managed such figures. The Trench negotiations show him exploiting coalition fragility, even at the cost

of internal contestation within Medina. Khaybar highlights his effort to sever alliance networks before they could harden into effective opposition, and the al-Jināb raid demonstrates that he still contained ‘Uyaynah coercively even after Khaybar’s fall. Most revealing, however, is the blood-money vignette on the Ḥunayn campaign: Muḥammad (*The Final Prophet of Allah, Peace be upon him, his Progeny and Companions*) acknowledged the legitimacy of customary options, yet pressed publicly for repentance and forgiveness, only to watch Arabian blood-honour norms prevail in practice. That moment captures the limits of moral transformation when the new polity confronted entrenched tribal expectations, and it helps to explain why subsequent “reconciliation” relied not only on exhortation but on gifts, appointments, and controlled inclusion.

Finally, ‘Uyaynah’s later use as a collector of *ṣadaqah* or *zakāt* and his participation at Tabūk point to an outcome more complex than either wholehearted assimilation or perpetual rebellion. The Medinan polity absorbed him instrumentally while never fully trusting him. He, in turn, adjusted to the new order while remaining accountable to a constituency that included non-Muslim Fazārīs. The case therefore clarifies a broader historical point: early Islamic authority in central Arabia expanded not only through conquest or conversion, but through the negotiated domestication of frontier elites whose cooperation proved indispensable even when their integration remained incomplete.

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Notes and References:

¹ Muḥammad b. ‘Umar al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1984), 2:804.

² Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:729.

³ Al-Wāqidī’s student Ibn Sa’d suggests that Muḥammad approached Mecca between Abū Bakr and ‘Usayd b. ḫulayr, yet he does not specially say that he entered with or between them. See Muḥammad b. Sa’d b. Manī’ al-Baṣrī al-Hāshimī, *Kitāb al-‘Ubaqāt al-kubrā* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2017), 2:103. Ibn Hishām, al-Balādhurī and al-Ṭabarī are silent on the issue.

⁴ Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashraf* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1997), 13:171; W.

Montgomery Watt, “Fazāra,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 2:873.

⁵ Abū Muḥammad ‘Alī b. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm, *Jamharat ansāb al-‘Arab* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1982), 255–56.

⁶ A. P. Caussin de Perceval, *Essai sur l'histoire des Arabes avant l'islamisme, pendant l'époque de Mahomet, et jusqu'à la réduction de toutes les tribus sous la loi musulmane* (Paris: Firmin Didot frères, 1847–48), 2:424–26; Egbert Meyer, *Der historische Gehalt der Aiyām al-'Arab*, *Schriften der Max Freiherr von Oppenheim-Stiftung*, no. 7 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970), 50–65.

⁷ Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Qalqashandī, *Nihāyat al-arab fī ma'rifat ansāb al-'Arab*, ed. Ibrāhīm al-Ibyārī (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya, 1980), 1:392.

⁸ 'Abd al-Malik b. Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 2024), 875; al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:564; Ibn Sa'd, *Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, 69; Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 2023), 2:127.

⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:142.

¹⁰ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:651, 652.

¹¹ Muḥammad b. Ismā'īl al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* (Cairo: Dār al-Afāq al-'Arabiyyah, 2004), 579, 580, ḥadīth 2868, 2870.

¹² Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:538.

¹³ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:422.

¹⁴ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, 13:165–71.

¹⁵ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, 13:165–71.

¹⁶ Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, 13:171.

¹⁷ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:422–423.

¹⁸ Ibn Sa'd, *Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, 48.

¹⁹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:90.

²⁰ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:443.

²¹ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:443; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, 1:427.

²² Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:459.

²³ Qur'ān, Sūrat al-Aḥzāb 33:10; Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya*, 626; al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:459; al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:96; Mūsā b. 'Uqba, *Maghāzī Sayyidinā Muḥammad* (Fes: Manshūrāt al-Bashīr b. 'Aṭīyya, 2023), 2:372; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, 1:428.

²⁴ Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya*, 626; al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:477; al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:94.

²⁵ Ibn Sa'd, *Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, 2:56; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, 1:430.

²⁶ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:478–79.

²⁷ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:479–80.

²⁸ W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad at Medina* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 92.

²⁹ Mūsā b. 'Uqba, *Maghāzī*, 2:216–22; Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya*, 664–69; al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:537–49; Ibn Sa'd, *Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, 2:61–65; al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:105–8.

³⁰ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:537–38.

³¹ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:538.

³² Cf. al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:754–55.

³³ Mūsā b. 'Uqba, *Maghāzī*, 2:218.

³⁴ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:545–46; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, 1:437.

³⁵ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:546–47.

³⁶ Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya*, 668.

³⁷ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:546; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, 1:437.

³⁸ Qur'ān, Sūrat al-Nisā' 4:102.

³⁹ Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya*, 669; Mūsā b. 'Uqba, *Maghāzī*, 2:222.

⁴⁰ Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Abī Sahl Abū Bakr al-Sarakhsī, *Kitāb al-Mabsūṭ fī al-fiqh al-Ḥanafī* (Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Sa'āda, 1906), 10:86, 298 "wa-qad qabila Rasūl Allāh ṣallā Allāhu 'alayhi wa-sallam fī al-muwāda'a yawma al-Ḥudaybiyya mina al-sharṭi mā huwa a ḥamu min hādhā. fa-inna ahla Makka sharaṭū 'alayhi an yuradda 'alayhim

kullu man atā musliman minhum, wa-waḥḥā lahum bi-hādhā al-sharṭi ilā an intasakha, li-annahū kāna fīhi naẓarun li-l-muslimīn, li-mā kāna bayna ahl Makka wa-ahl Khaybar min al-muwāḥa'a 'alā anna Rasūl Allāh ṣallā Allāhu 'alayhi wa-sallam idhā tawajjaha ilā aḥadi al-farīqayn aghāra al-farīqu al-ākharu 'alā al-Madīna. fa-wāda'a ahl Makka ḥattā ya'mana min jānibihim idhā tawajjaha ilā Khaybar."

⁴¹ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:642.

⁴² Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:640, 642; Aḥmad b. 'Alī al-Maqrīzī, *Imtā' al-asmā' fī sharḥ Abī Shujā'* (Al-Kuwayt: Dār al-Ḍiyā' lil-Nashr wa-l-Tawzī', 2005), 1:310.

⁴³ Al-Maqrīzī, *Imtā' al-asmā'*, 1:311.

⁴⁴ Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya*, 694; al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:135.

⁴⁵ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:650.

⁴⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, *Imtā' al-asmā'*, 1:313.

⁴⁷ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:650; Mūsā b. 'Uqba, *Maghāzī*, 3:75.

⁴⁸ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:650.

⁴⁹ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:650–52.

⁵⁰ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:652.

⁵¹ Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya*, 694; al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:135.

⁵² Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:676.

⁵³ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:676.

⁵⁴ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:677.

⁵⁵ Mūsā b. 'Uqba, *Maghāzī*, 3:75.

⁵⁶ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:675–76.

⁵⁷ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:675–76.

⁵⁸ Mūsā b. 'Uqba, *Maghāzī*, 3:75.

⁵⁹ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:727–28; al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:142.

⁶⁰ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:728; Ibn Sa'd, *Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, 2:91–92; al-Maqrīzī, *Imtā' al-asmā'*, 1:335.

⁶¹ Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:142.

⁶² Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:729.

⁶³ Al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:123.

⁶⁴ Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya*, 730; al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:783; Ibn Sa'd, *Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, 2:102; al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:152.

⁶⁵ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:870.

⁶⁶ Michael Lecker, "'Uyayna b. Ḥiṣn,'" *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), 10:959–60.

⁶⁷ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:804.

⁶⁸ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:804.

⁶⁹ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 2:804.

⁷⁰ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 3:919–921.

⁷¹ Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 3:933. Al-Wāqidi records Abū Bakr saying to 'Uyayna: "Then you submitted [or converted], so you say [*thumma aslamta kamā taz'umu*]." The phrase carries a sceptical or ironic tone. *Taz'umu* ("you claim/say") implies doubt about the sincerity or reality of the conversion. In context, it means something closer to: "Then you became Muslim, so you say," or more pointedly, "Then you supposedly accepted Islam."

⁷² Watt, *Muhammad at Medina*, 94–95.

⁷³ Ibn Sa'd, *Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, 2:116; al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:175.

⁷⁴ Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīra al-nabawiyya*, 801; al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 3:948. Al-Ṭabarī repeats the statement in slightly different words: *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:176.

⁷⁵ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 3:933; cf. al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:173.

⁷⁶ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 3:974–975; al-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, 2:209.

⁷⁷ Qur’ān, Sūrat al-Tawba 9:101.

⁷⁸ Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, 3:1025, 1072.